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reducing the disease burden in the population. 2 The reasons why the aim of EUCS is presented in terms of 'autonomy' rather than 'prevention' have not been spelled out in the literature. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap by considering the morally relevant similarities and dissimilarities between foetal anomaly screening, ancestry-based carrier screening and EUCS. By doing so, we intend to provide an ethically sustainable account of the aims of EUCS.
We will argue that, when carrier screening is performed during pregnancy, enhancing autonomy appears the most appropriate aim of EUCS. After all, 'prevention' would urge women and their partners to terminate wanted pregnancies. However, when screening is offered in the preconception period, proven carrier couples can choose a wider range of reproductive options than only prenatal diagnosis followed by a possible termination of pregnancy, for instance gamete donation and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). 3 We will therefore suggest that, to the extent that this increased control over passing on a genetic disorder raises questions of parental responsibility, it seems necessary that the account of the aims of EUCS is wider than only in terms of enhancing reproductive autonomy. Before we move on, we would like to make two notes of clarification. Firstly, we use the term 'prospective parents' to refer to persons who intend to conceive in the foreseeable future. 4 Secondly, we focus on the moral rather than the legal responsibilities of prospective parents.
| DYNAMI C S OF C ARRIER SCREENING
Reproductive genetic screening has been offered to pregnant women and prospective parents for more than 50 years. Prenatal screening for Down syndrome first became possible in the late 1960s, when the association between 'advanced maternal age' and the prevalence of Down syndrome at birth was identified and a diagnostic test became available. 5 Concurrent with the emergence of foetal anomaly screening, 'ancestry-based' or 'ethnicity-based' carrier screening programmes were developed among populations with an increased prevalence of specific recessive disorders, for instance carrier screening for beta-thalassaemia in the Mediterranean region 6 and Tay-Sachs disease carrier screening among the Ashkenazi Jewish population. 7 Whereas some of these programmes primarily addressed young individuals or couples who might consider starting a pregnancy, others were offered to couples seeking prenatal care. A more recent development is the promotion of universal approaches that offer screening to all individuals or couples of reproductive age, for instance carrier screening for cystic fibrosis (CF) in the United
States. 8 In Box 1, we provide some background information on the carrier screening process.
The availability of new genomic testing possibilities has given carrier screening a new incentive: it allows for efficient screening of tens to hundreds of disease-causing mutations at the same time, usually at much lower costs than separately screening for beta-thalassaemia, Tay-Sachs disease, and so on. 10 As a result, carrier screening panels for the Ashkenazi Jewish population have expanded and now in- 
| AIMS OF REPRODUC TIVE G ENE TI C SCREENING
In the early days of reproductive screening, prevention, in the sense of reducing the birth prevalence of serious disorders, was seen by many as the primary aim of all reproductive screening programmes, both during and prior to pregnancy. For instance, in an influential paper, public health epidemiologists Zena Stein and Mervyn Susser advocated prenatal diagnostic testing and elective termination of pregnancy as preventive measures to reduce the incidence of Down syndrome at birth. 17 In the same vein, paediatrician and geneticist Ian Porter argued for 'prevention through genetic counseling for reproductive options'. 18 Despite being in line with the aim of most other public health programmes, this emphasis on prevention was soon felt to raise ethical concerns, especially with regard to screening for abnormalities during pregnancy. These concerns were (and are) twofold. Firstly, however much it is stressed that screening should allow women to make their own decisions, it is difficult to see how an account of prenatal screening as aimed at bringing down the number of children born with the relevant conditions would not promote nudging women into making the 'right' reproductive choices. Secondly, the 'prevention paradigm' has invited the criticism of disability rights' advocates, according to whom the practice reflects a discriminatory attitude towards people living with the relevant conditions.
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In order to avoid these moral challenges, official accounts of the aim of prenatal screening as given by government bodies or public health authorities have moved away from the language of prevention. 20 The aim of screening for foetal abnormalities is rather understood as en- In the early 1980s, the Archbishop announced a quasi-mandatory premarital screening and counselling programme, which was actively supported by various agencies of the Cypriot Government. Couples who wish to get married by the Orthodox Church are required to be screened and counselled by the Thalassaemia Centre and be issued with a certificate.
As a result of the screening programme, the number of Cypriot children born with beta-thalassaemia has reduced to virtually zero. of Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean (Québec), offering carrier screeningboth in the preconception and the prenatal period -for four serious recessive disorders that, due to a founder effect, are highly frequent among the region's population. 28 In a framework document issued
by the Corporation de Recherche et d'Action sur les Maladies
Héréditaires (CORAMH, a regional grass-root organization set up in the 1990s by parents, researchers and health professionals), the need for such a pilot is explicitly accounted for in terms of a 'prevention programme'. 29 However, an evaluation report of the same pilot issued by the Québec National Public Health Institute does not refer to the aim of the programme in these terms, but only in those of enabling participants to find out about their carrier status and use that information for well informed reproductive decision making. have commented that '[t]he focus on information rather than on reduced incidence of disease in CF carrier screening appears to reflect a lack of consensus about the desirability of reducing the incidence of CF births in the U.S.' Moreover, it suggests that 'different measures of success will be needed for CF carrier screening'.
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The aim of EUCS is understood along the same lines. As stressed in programmatic documents and position statements, Although we support the criticism of 'prevention through selective abortion', it does not follow, in our view, that 'prevention through preconception reproductive choices' is equally problematic. Clearly, the arguments against prevention as pertaining to screening for foetal abnormalities such as Down syndrome also apply to carrier screening during pregnancy: couples who are expecting a child with a recessive disease should not be nudged into terminating a wanted pregnancy, but feel free to 'make decisions that they judge to be right for them in the circumstances in which they find themselves at the time'. 34 In the preconception period, however, a preventionaimed approach may be less problematic. Earlier, we explained that We also need to bear in mind that a significant number of couples choosing this trajectory remain involuntarily childless. 38 Many couples do not regard gamete donation as a worthy alternative to PGD, as they favour genetic over non-genetic parenthood. 39 In reflecting on the proportionality of prevention-aimed PCS, these factors need to be taken into consideration.
Third, it is important to note that various couples who learn about their carrier status in the preconception period might still decide to achieve a natural pregnancy. We just argued that couples who are informed about their carrier status when they are already expecting a child should feel free to make their own decisions with regard to pregnancy termination. Depending on the severity of the condition, a wait-and-see approach might be more problematic when carrier couples are aware of the risk of an affected pregnancy already prior to conception. If carrier couples prefer to avoid the birth of an affected child by opting for prenatal diagnosis followed by a possible termination of pregnancy, rather than by means of PGD, they should feel free to follow this route. However, as many expectant parents are already emotionally attached to their unborn child, it is important that, before getting pregnant, carrier couples consider for themselves whether they are prepared to carry the burden of a medically induced abortion.
If they consider this to be an undue burden, they might have the moral responsibility to choose a PGD trajectory.
| PER S PEC TIVE S ON RE S P ON S IB LE PARENTHOOD
We just suggested that the case for the prevention view as connecting with a parental responsibility can more likely be made in the pre- Although we realize that PNM and PB may be used somewhat differently depending on who is using them, we think that we offer a reasonable interpretation of what these principles may imply with regard to prevention-aimed PCS.
| The principle of procreative non-maleficence
According to PNM, it is morally wrong to bring children into the world when there is good reason to think that their quality of life will fall below an acceptable threshold. For carrier couples, this would most likely imply that they have a moral duty to avoid conceiving an However, based on PNM, one could also argue that the moral duty to participate in PCS is not related to the risk of being a carrier couple, but merely depends on the severity of the disease under consideration, and therefore extends to all couples who wish to have children.
Clarkeburn is an advocate of this position: 'If a condition which is worse than non-existence were identified, the parental duty of [PNM], in a moral sense, would extend even to those parents with only a minimal chance of having a child with such a condition.' 50 This second interpretation of PNM (PNM2) would thus require that all prospective parents undergo PCS for a limited number of very serious genetic disorders.
Proven carrier couples would have a moral obligation to take preventive measures.
| The principle of procreative beneficence
According to some philosophers, couples have a moral duty to avoid the conception of children not only in cases dealing with unbearable suffering, but in all situations in which they can choose between a 'less'
and a 'more' advantaged child. One of them is Julian Savulescu. He claims that we need a more comprehensive principle, to which he refers as the 'principle of procreative beneficence'. This maximizing principle suggests that couples who have decided to have a child 'have a significant moral reason to select the child, of the possible children they could have, whose life can be expected … to go best or at least not worse than any of the others'. 51 The phrase 'significant moral reason' indicates that PB, like PNM, is a prima facie rather than an absolute moral obligation; it may be trumped by competing moral considerations, including 'the wel- Earlier, we argued that parental responsibilities by definition focus on the relation between (prospective) parents and their (future) offspring.
As the moral duties implied by the wide person-affecting and the im- 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors declare no conflict of interest. 
ORCID

